Canada, China and the Arctic
Prime Minister Harper is currently touring the North to highlight Canada’s “great national dream” of tapping the Arctic’s mineral and energy bounty. He’ll visit gold and copper mines in the Yukon, oil and gas projects in the Northwest Territories, and drop in on troops involved in Operation Nanook, the annual summer military exercises that seek to project Canadian sovereignty.
But just prior to Harper’s visit, China’s icebreaker Xuelong (Snow Dragon) arrived in Iceland sailing the northern passage along the Russian coast. While China’s eyes have been fixed on the Arctic for years, the successful journey, made more possible by record ice melts, represents a key step in realizing its scientific, economic, and geo-political aspirations in the region. This has become all the more important for Canada as it assumes the leadership of the 8 member Arctic Council next year. China and several other countries are applying to join as permanent observers.
In addition to the Xuelong voyages, China’s credentials include its Polar Institute, the Arctic research station at Alesund, Svalbard along with two others (in Antarctica), and a soon to be built Institute of Arctic Studies in Shanghai in collaboration with the Icelanders. It has also commissioned Finnish firm Aker to design and assemble a state-of-the-art icebreaker at a cost of US$200 million to be launched in 2014. The new ship would be able to break through 1.5 meters of ice and possess marine geology, magnetic and seismic survey, and marine biology and ecology research capabilities. All together, since 1984, China has conducted 31 expeditions to the Arctic, on which they have invited foreign experts.
Writing in the Meridian Newsletter of the Canadian Polar Commission, University of Calgary political scientist Rob Huebert outlined China’s interests in the Arctic. Aside from pure scientific research, China is interested in the potential impact of climate change on maritime navigation. Shipping costs could be cut considerably if new trade routes could be developed through relatively ice-free waters, especially during the summer. China is also keenly interested in Arctic oil and gas and mineral resources. The US Geological Survey estimates that 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of natural gas reserves lie north of the Arctic Circle.
Of course, the Chinese have a strong interest in the geo-political implications of the Arctic. While they cannot vote, permanent observers can propose projects through member countries, and with permission, issue statements and express views at Council subsidiary bodies. Canada will lead the members to decide on observer applications next May and member states recognize it is better for China to be in the club rather than out. But, regardless of the outcome, China has indicated its intent on becoming a major player in the Arctic.
To that end, China has been actively wooing members with state visits and offers of investment and collaboration in sustainable development and renewable energy. Earlier this year, President Hu Jintao made the first Chinese head of state visit to Denmark and Premier Wen Jiabao flew to Iceland and Sweden. Both diplomatic events were covered prominently at home.
Icelandic officials are “generally in favour” of admitting China and other applicants and the Danish say they support those applicants who live up to the criteria set by council ministers at their meeting in Nuuk, Greenland last year. The main uncertainty lies in Norway’s fracas with China over the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Yet, a spokesman for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry said recently that it is the country’s long-standing position to support China’s inclusion although regrettably no high-level consultations have been conducted due to the freeze in relations.
Meanwhile, Canada may face a slight dilemma when takes over the chairmanship of the Council. Canada is reluctant to extend observer status to the EU because of its ban on seal products. Postponing any decision may be seen by China as a slight that could sour other aspects of the relationship. The Harper government has pinned hopes on the diversification of Canadian oil exports to Asian customers and China is the second largest energy importer. If Canada supports China and not the EU, it could be perceived as favouritism and anti-EU. The best outcome for Canada would be if the current Swedish chair delivers a surprise and resolves the issue before the transfer of power.